Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶114
Let us, then, step back and examine the origin and consequences of the majority’s unprecedented invocation of a “categorical font-of-power condition” limiting Congress’s reach under the Spending Clause. Talevski, 599 U. S., at 192 (rejecting a similar effort). This limitation is not located in the Constitution’s text; “[i]t is hard to imagine a broader statement of the scope of Congress’s power” than the Spending Clause. E. Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 Chapman L. Rev. 89, 93 (2001). And it is not in our precedents either—today’s Court cannot successfully explain the decisions of yesterday’s. Rather, it appears that the seeds of the majority’s dramatic weakening of the spending power were first planted some time ago, and are rooted in a loose contract analogy the Court has repeatedly cautioned against taking as anything more. The majority supercharges that analogy here…Read in context ›
slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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