Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶116
The contract analogy derives from the insight that Spending Clause legislation requires acceptance of federal funds before it can take hold, making it “much in the nature of a contract.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Hal derman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Until today, we have used that insight in two relatively modest ways, both as interpretive aids. First, the contract analogy gives rise to a clear-notice requirement. See, e.g., id., at 24–25; Part II–C, supra. Second, the analogy offers background principles to fill in gaps where a statute falls short of the required clarity. See, e.g., Cummings, 596 U. S., at 220, 221 (explaining that a Spending Clause statute that is “silent as to available remedies” presumptively authorizes “the usual contract remedies” (emphasis deleted)); Barnes, 536 U. S., at 187 (“A funding recipient is generally on notice that it is subject not only to…Read in context ›
slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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