Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶118

At most, the Court has accepted that Spending Clause legislation has “a contractual aspect” while steadfastly insisting that such laws nonetheless “cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing a concrete transaction.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985); accord, B. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 Yale L. J. 2326, 2330 (2020) (noting spending statutes’ “dual character” as “both contract-like instruments and public lawmaking instruments”). After all, “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings,” Spending Clause laws are “statut[es] . . . expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Bennett, 470 U. S., at 669. Having undergone bicameralism and presentment, Spending Clause legislation “is legislation, in the end, not a buy-sell transaction.” T. Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement…

slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.