Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶129

Indeed, it is our rejection of the strict contract analogy that renders Spending Clause rights enforceable under §1983. See Talevski, 599 U. S., at 229 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); accord, D. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S. D. L. Rev. 496, 510 (2007). Similarly, contracts presumably may not preempt state law, yet Spending Clause legislation can do so. See, e.g., Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Services, 516 U. S. 474, 476 (1996) (per curiam); Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U. S. 395, 396 (1988) (per curiam); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U. S. 413, 417 (1973); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286 (1971). And Congress likely could not hitch its Necessary and Proper power to a mere contract, either, see Engdahl, 52 S. D. L. Rev., at 532, but we have blessed just this cocktail of enumerated powers, see Sabri, 541 U. S., at 605.

slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.