Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶20
To sort out whether consent exists—and thus whether a condition associated with spending legislation is enforceable—we have traditionally turned to contract principles for guidance. See Sossamon, 563 U. S., at 290 (The contract analogy represents “a . . . limitation on” the “liability” Spending Clause statutes may impose (emphasis deleted)). Consider some examples. At common law, coerced assent to a contract is invalid. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §175(1) (1979). Likewise, we have held, coerced assent to a spending condition—by way of an economic “gun to the head”—is invalid. National Federation of Independ ent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 581–582 (2012) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); see also id., at 676–677 (joint dissent of Scalia, Kennedy, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ.); Dole, 483 U. S., at 211. At common law, ambiguous contractual language is construed against its drafter.…Read in context ›
slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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