Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶32

Responding to these problems, Mr. Landor and the dissent submit that RLUIPA’s mere existence sufficed to alert the individual defendants, or at least their employer, that they could be held personally liable. See Brief for Petitioner 35; post, at 20. But, just like the attempt to rewrite Dole, this argument misses the point. A Spending Clause statute does not carry independent regulatory force. It assumes binding effect only through “voluntar[y] and knowin[g]” agreement. Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17. If someone has not agreed to be bound, it does not matter that he may be aware of the existence of a contract between other parties. And if someone has not agreed to be bound, it does not matter whether other contracting parties might wish to bind him. Either way, he has not agreed to be bound, so he cannot be.

slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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