Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶37

The dissent criticizes us for “trot[ting] out” this “parade of horribles.” Post, at 24. But if this is a parade, the dissent marches right along, embracing these hypotheticals and more. See post, at 24–25. In fact, as the dissent sees it, we should not engage in “hairsplitting” over any “strict direct-consentto-liability . . . requirement” or “ill-formed” contract analogy. Post, at 17, 25. On its view, these things are all just “empt[y] . . . formalism[s].” Post, at 24. If Congress can ask individuals to consent to funding conditions—or ask States to enact laws in order to receive federal funds—Congress might as well be allowed to regulate private behavior directly. Ibid. Likely enough, that vision would have delighted Gouverneur Morris. But it is one at war with the terms of the Spending Clause, how that Clause has been widely understood since the founding, and a long line of this…

slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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