Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶45

Just consider what they would have us say. On their view, Congress may evade the consent requirement inherent in its Spending Clause authority simply by invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause. Post, at 17–20. With even a modest federal expenditure somewhere nearby, Congress could then proceed to regulate directly the conduct of countless nonconsenting individuals—not just the individual officers here, but also others like the coaches and physicians we discussed above. See Part III–C, supra. Congress could regulate directly, too, in innumerable spheres, including ones traditionally reserved to the States. Really, under Mr. Landor’s and the dissent’s logic, we would be “hard pressed to posit any activity . . . that Congress [would be] without power to regulate.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 564 (1995). And as inconsistent as all that is with both principles of state…

slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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