Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety · ¶80

But RLUIPA’s authorization of an individual-capacity damages remedy is unambiguous for Spending Clause purposes. Our cases foreclose any argument to the contrary. Eight years before Congress passed RLUIPA, we considered the remedies available under Title IX, another Spending Clause statute—but one far less clear about remedies. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 64–65 (1992). Where RLUIPA is strident, Title IX is coy: That statute has no express private right of action and, accordingly, no relevant remedial language. Id., at 65–66, 71. Yet we still concluded that it authorized damages. We explained that, even absent explicit statutory language, “we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” Id., at 66. And we flatly rejected the notion “that the normal presumption in favor of all appropriate…

slip opinion, revised 6/28/26
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