Wolford v. Lopez · ¶94

Consider how Hawaii and the principal dissent’s argument would play out in another context. What if a State made it a crime to wear religious head garb (say, a hijab) onto private property open to the public without obtaining express authorization? Could that statute evade constitutional scrutiny? On Hawaii and the principal dissent’s logic, the answer is apparently yes: No one has the right to enter another’s property without permission, and the State has merely adjusted the default to require permission to be clear. But that is plainly wrong. Because the law regulates religious and expressive conduct, its enactment is state action that triggers First Amendment scrutiny. Cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943) (municipal ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation violates the First Amendment).

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