Rico v. United States · ¶26

If its arguments from statutory text fall short, the government replies, its arguments from precedent fll the gap. In particular, the government suggests, our decisions in Mont and United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53 (2000), require us to adopt the Ninth Circuit's rule. But here, too, we just don't see it. Mont simply recognized that § 3624(e)'s express terms suspend (or truly toll) a defendant's term of supervised release while he remains imprisoned for a separate state offense before trial. 587 U. S., at 521. And if that express tolling rule highlights anything, it is only, as we have seen, the absence of anything like the Ninth Circuit's rule in the statutory text. See Part II–A, supra.

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