Rico v. United States · ¶32

We fail to see how any of this moves the needle. Corall might teach that, thanks to background common-law principles, a defendant's federal parole clock stops running during his time in state prison. But what does that prove? When it comes to supervised release, as we have seen, Congress has already codified a similar rule, providing that a defendant's incarceration for 30 days or more pauses his term of supervised release. § 3624(e). And none of that means the government is entitled to an additional and very different rule that would automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release beyond what a court has ordered and possibly even beyond the statutory maximum. Simply put, Corall did not even contemplate, let alone endorse, anything like the Ninth Circuit's rule.

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