Hunter v. United States · ¶123
That logic overlooks what is at issue here. The Court's supervisory authority may have been understood to reach the judicial procedure for accepting the plea agreement itself, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 464 (1969), but it does not follow that it includes the power to change the substantive provisions of valid plea agreements once they have been approved and made binding. This case illustrates the problem: Hunter is not challenging anything related to the District Court's approval of his plea agreement. To the contrary, he seems to hope that the agreement is still binding, as he suggests that he would resist any effort by the Government to reinstate the nine counts it dropped. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–7. He instead simply wants the agreement changed by the Court of Appeals to permit his appeal. But, the supervisory power does not permit either rewriting the parties'…Read in context ›
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