Hunter v. United States · ¶65

A miscarriage of justice would seem to arise, as well, when a district court metes out punishment that is so substantively unreasonable that it would fail under the “deferential abuse- of-discretion standard” that appellate courts already apply in sentencing challenges. Gall, 552 U. S., at 41, 51–52. Along those lines, lower courts applying the miscarriage-of-justice rule have acknowledged that “egregious” harm necessarily results from any supervised release condition, or any other component of a sentence, “wholly unrelated to legitimate sentencing purposes” or “lacking in rationality.” United States v. Boudreau, 58 F. 4th 26, 33 (CA1 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., United States v. Velez-Luciano, 814 F. 3d 553, 564–565 (CA1 2016) (“a highly invasive [medical] procedure” that “has no effcacy”).

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