Monsanto v. Durnell · ¶123

These two parts of §136a(f)(2) work in tandem. Registration is prima facie evidence that the pesticide's label complies with FIFRA's requirements, meaning that the EPA's approval refects the agency's best judgment that the label satisfes FIFRA. See § 136a(c)(5)(B). But prima facie evidence is not conclusive evidence. Thus, the statute clarifes that, in the face of a misbranding charge, the EPA's registration is not a defense. This means that the EPA's approval of a pesticide's label cannot conclusively establish that the pesticide is not misbranded. The statute, in other words, does not treat as infallible the EPA's judgment as to whether FIFRA's misbranding provision has been violated. For that reason, a pesticide may be “registered but nevertheless misbranded.” Bates, 544 U. S., at 438.

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