Monsanto v. Durnell · ¶130
The majority notes, for example, that §136a(f )(2) is in the portion of the registration statute titled “[m]iscellaneous,” and reasons that “it would be rather bizarre” for a miscellaneous provision to “upend” the statute’s preemption provision. Ante, at 18. But the policy concern about exposing manufacturers to disruptive tort liability is no basis for ignoring the statute’s text. And the argument is also substantively faulty. It assumes the conclusion that the EPA’s approval of a label creates a “requirement” with preemptive force (hence the bizarreness of housing this consequential provision in a “miscellaneous” section of the statute). Under a correct interpretation of §136a(f )(2), however, the EPA’s approval of the label does not create requirements. So registration does not preempt different or additional state-law requirements, §136a(f )(2) does not upend anything, and the…Read in context ›
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