Monsanto v. Durnell · ¶133

The majority also tries to cast doubt on §136a(f)(2)'s relevance to the preemption provision. In particular, the majority argues that §136a(f)(2) does not apply to state tort lawsuits as a general matter, and that it would not apply here because Monsanto did not invoke the fact of registration as a defense to Durnell's claim. Ante, at 390, 392. But this framing misses the point. Section 136a(f)(2)'s relevance to the preemption question is not whether Monsanto intends to, or can, invoke registration as a defense to Durnell's failureto-warn suit. Instead, §136a(f)(2) clarifes that a “no misbranding” conclusion cannot be based on the fact of registration alone, thus demonstrating that registration itself does not create a labeling requirement under FIFRA—in any context.

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