Monsanto v. Durnell · ¶153

To be sure, our decision in Bartlett largely rejected a “stop-selling rationale” as “incompatible with our pre- emption jurisprudence.” 570 U. S., at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). But we also expressly left open the possibility that a manufacturer could avoid state and federal liability if the state claim “parallel[ed] the federal misbranding statute” at issue in that case. Id., at 487, n. 4. This was because the relevant misbranding statute could require the manufacturer to pull the product from the market. Ibid. As support for this conclusion, we cited Bates, implying that we were not deciding whether a “stop-selling rationale” would (or would not) work to avoid implied preemption where the federal and state standards are equivalent and impose a duty not to sell misbranded products. This case thus falls squarely into the exception seemingly left open by Bartlett.

slip opinion
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.