Monsanto v. Durnell · ¶72

But suppose (contrary to the United States’ express representation to this Court) that EPA someday did charge a manufacturer with misbranding for using the EPA- approved and EPA-required label. Even in that unlikely scenario, Durnell’s §136a(f )(2) argument would falter in light of the statutory text and context. To reiterate, §136a(f )(2)’s proviso that registration is not a defense is limited to EPA enforcement actions for “any offense under this subchapter.” And it would be rather bizarre to read a provision entitled “[m]iscellaneous” and dealing only with a defense to an EPA enforcement action to upend FIFRA’s carefully calibrated and EPA-centric regulatory scheme. Make no mistake: Durnell’s §136a(f )(2) argument would negate FIFRA’s express preemption clause, expose manufacturers to potentially massive tort liability for doing what EPA required them to do, and eviscerate the…

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