Louisiana v. Callais · ¶167

But before becoming so granular, it is worth asking what precedents support the majority's insistence on evidence of racially discriminatory intent. By now, I hope, no reader will think those precedents concern Section 2. Our Section 2 precedents are quite to the contrary: It is “patently clear,” Allen recently summarized, that because Section 2 liability “turns on the presence of discriminatory effects, not discriminatory intent,” a plaintiff need not demonstrate a “purpose of racial discrimination.” 599 U. S., at 25 (quoting Gingles, 478 U. S., at 71, n. 34). So the majority must go further afeld. Its citations regarding the plaintiff 's “special burden” of showing that race rather than politics (or anything else) motivated the State are from this Court's racial-gerrymandering jurisprudence. See ante, at 115 (citing Alexan der and Cooper). But racial gerrymandering claims and…

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