Louisiana v. Callais · ¶177
There is only one “special burden” appropriate to deciding this case. Ante, at 115. And it is not the utterly novel one that the majority imposes on Section 2 vote-dilution plaintiffs to “disentangle” state motives. Ibid. Rather, it is the well-settled one that the Court itself must meet before overturning precedent about the meaning of a statute. Our law is clear. Stare decisis—the presumption that “today's Court should stand by yesterday's decisions”—“carries enhanced force” when the decision in question “interprets a statute.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455– 456 (2015). That is because our statutory, unlike our constitutional, rulings can always be changed by Congress itself. See id., at 456. (Just recall how Congress rejected our decision in Bolden.) When this Court has said what a statute means—and Congress has said nothing to the contrary—a “superpowered…Read in context ›
preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.