Louisiana v. Callais · ¶71

For this reason, the focus of § 2 must be enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition on intentional racial discrimination. When § 2 is properly interpreted in the way we have outlined, it is sufficiently congruent with and proportional to the Amendment's prohibition. While that interpretation does not demand a finding of intentional discrimination, it imposes liability only when the circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred. Suppose, for example, that the application of a State's districting algorithm yields numerous maps with districts in which the members of a minority group constitute a majority, and suppose that the State cannot provide a legitimate reason for rejecting all those maps and eliminating all majority-minority districts. In such a situation, the inference of racial motivation is strong, and § 2 of the Fifteenth…

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