Pitts v. Mississippi · ¶17

Under Coy and Craig, a trial court may not deny a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to meet his accusers face to face simply because a state statute permits screening. Nor may a court authorize screening based on “generalized find- ing[s]” of necessity underlying such a statute. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Instead, the Sixth Amendment tolerates screening in child-abuse cases only if a court “hear[s] evidence” and issues a “case-specific” finding of “[t]he requisite . . . necessity.” See Craig, 497 U. S., at 855. The Mississippi Supreme Court attempted to avoid these constraints by distinguishing Coy and Craig in various ways. But none of the court's distinctions persuades. Consider the most salient theories it pressed:

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