United States v. Hemani · ¶88

In response, this Court speaks in the same register. It rejects the government's means-end calculus by suggesting that the government has not established that the actual purpose of § 922(g)(3) is to disarm “unusually dangerous” people. Ante, at 791 (internal quotation marks omitted). Using the substances that trigger application of § 922(g)(3) even regularly does not, in the Court's view, necessarily make users dangerous, violent, or otherwise susceptible to misusing frearms. See ante, at 791–794. In other words, the Court's discussion implies that § 922(g)(3)'s operation is not sufficiently tailored to the government's stated purpose—precisely the issue to which means-end scrutiny would direct our focus.

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