Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶118

None of these cases can be readily explained by “commonsense principles of communication.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514 (Barrett, J., concurring). None involved a phrase like “drew blood” susceptible to two conventional idiomatic meanings, one of which any English speaker faced with the law at issue might quickly rule out. Quite the opposite; in each case the agency had a strong argument that the statutory language, commonsensically read, granted the power it claimed. Meanwhile, all our major questions cases can be easily explained by reference to a rule requiring the executive branch to identify clear statutory authority when it claims Congress has granted it an extraordinary power. And that is a “dice-loading” rule, plain and simple, one designed to protect Article I, a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e] external” to the statutory terms at hand. Id., at 508.

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