Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶125

To be sure, in places Justice Barrett concedes that her gloss on the major questions doctrine requires resort to something more than “common sense” instincts about what would “ `g[o] without saying' ” to an ordinary English speaker. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512 (concurring opinion); see also post, at 301. Sometimes, she suggests, common sense doesn't just help illuminate the “most natural” meaning of an idiomatic term like “drew blood” based on its presence in a penal law. 600 U. S., at 508. Sometimes, she says, “commonsense principles of communication” go much further. Id., at 514. So much so that they wind up dictating a rule counseling “skepticism” of executive claims to extraordinary delegated powers. Id., at 516. Why? Because, Justice Barrett says, a “reasonable observer” consults “our constitutional structure.” Id., at 515, 520. But if that's true, this version of common sense does…

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