Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶127

That is as it must be. The statutory terms contain no ambiguity we could use (or need) “commonsense principles of communication” to resolve. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514 (Barrett, J., concurring). This case is nothing like the “ `drew blood' ” illustration, where it might “ `g[o] without saying' ” that any ordinary person would immediately understand which of two idiomatic meanings a penal statute employed. Id., at 512. Indeed, today's principal opinion does not even “attempt to set forth the metes and bounds” of IEEPA's key phrase “ `regulate . . . importation,' ” ante, at 250, much less find the “best” or “most natural” meaning of those words, Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 521 (Barrett, J., concurring); post, at 300. Instead, we need go no further than to recognize that IEEPA fails to “clear[ly]” authorize tariffs. Ante, at 248, 255. And the only reason we can stop there is because…

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