Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶138
Fourth, is the President “relying on oblique, elliptical, or cryptic language”? Post, at 369. The dissent says no because “[t]his case does not involve elephants in mouseholes.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, the dissent insists, the provisions of IEEPA before us are not “ancillary” ones, but are designed to convey significant powers. Post, at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). It's a fair enough point as far as it goes. But our cases ask not just whether a provision is a “mousehole” or “ancillary.” They also caution against reading extraordinary powers into “broad or general” statutory language. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 746 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 291 (2011) (“[C]lear statement rules ensure Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic…Read in context ›
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