Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶184
To the extent that Justice Gorsuch also thinks that background legal conventions and constitutional structure inform the most natural reading of a statute, then we may not be very far apart. See ante, at 262–268 (concurring opinion). Our only disagreement may be over the level of clarity required before a particular interpretation can be deemed the most natural one. I understand Justice Gorsuch to require Congress always to speak precisely to any major power that it intends to give away. See ante, at 267– 269, 279–280 (concurring opinion). As I have said before, I think that other, “less obvious” clues can do the trick. See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514 (Barrett, J., concurring). I do not see any such clues here; in fact, as the Court explains, the clues we have point in the opposite direction. See, e. g., ante, at 243–244 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (detailing how Congress has elsewhere…Read in context ›
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