Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶191

I objected, in the principal cases cited, to the demand for a special brand of legislative clarity. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 764–784 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 542–550 (Kagan, J., dissenting). In my view, the Court used its clear-authorization rule in those cases to negate expansive delegations Congress had approved. I explained there that the proper way to interpret a delegation provision is through the standard rules of statutory construction. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 765–766 (Kagan, J., dissenting). That means, most concisely stated, reading text in context. More expansively put, it means examining a delegation provision's language, assessing that provision's place in the broader statutory scheme, and applying a “modicum of common sense” about how Congress typically delegates. Id., at 764 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see FDA v. Brown & William son…

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