Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶205

Like The Chief Justice's opinion, the principal dissent declines the help of legislative history. See post, at 344, n. 11 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). The dissent concludes that IEEPA and TWEA are “best understood” as authorizing tariffs, and that any other interpretation would “not make much sense.” Post, at 352–353, 357.But why would it matter which interpretation we think is “best” when Congress has already told us? The legislative history here plainly establishes that Congress understood and intended IEEPA and TWEA to authorize a wholly different type of power: the power to freeze foreign-owned property. And the proper role of the Court is to give effect to Congress's intent, not our own instincts. See United States v. Ameri can Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).

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