Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶298

The plaintiffs and the Court today seize on the word “regulate” in isolation, and say that it does not encompass the power to tariff. Ante, at 249–251. But the relevant statutory phrase is “regulate . . . importation.” And we must look to the meaning of the phrase as a whole, as our precedents dictate. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 406 (2011) (“[T]wo words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation”). As I have explained, since the Founding, tariffs on foreign imports have been a common means of regulating foreign commerce, including imports. Notably, under the Court's reading of the word “regulate,” Marshall, Story, and Madison all erred by concluding that the power to “regulate” foreign commerce includes the power to impose tariffs on foreign imports. That seems dubious.

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