Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶43

The Government argues first that the doctrine should not apply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal Parties 35– 36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already advanced in Nebraska. There, the Government contended that a different emergency statute should be interpreted broadly because its “whole point” was to provide “substantial discretion to . . . respond to unforeseen emergencies.” 600 U. S., at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected that argument in Nebraska, and we reject it here as well. “[E]mergency powers,” after all, “tend to kindle emergencies.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Dozens of IEEPA emergencies remain ongoing today, including the first—declared over four decades ago in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. CRS, Casey, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, at 20. And as…

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