Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶44
The Government's and the principal dissent's proposed foreign affairs exception fares no better. Brief for Federal Parties 34–35; post, at 373–384 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). As a general matter, the President of course enjoys some “independent constitutional power[s]” over foreign affairs “even without congressional authorization.” FCC v. Con sumers' Research, 606 U. S. 656, 707 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And Congress certainly may intend to “give the President substantial authority and fexibility” in many foreign affairs or national security contexts. Post, at 375 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting Consumers' Research, 606 U. S., at 706 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)). But “fip[ping]” the “presumption” under the major questions doctrine, Brief for Federal Parties 34, makes little sense when it comes to tariffs. As the Government admits, the President and Congress do not “enjoy…Read in context ›
preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.