Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump · ¶467
Because statutes that “involv[e] the external relations of the United States” do not trigger the same kind of delegation concerns as purely domestic ones, Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80 (opinion of Thomas, J.), the Court has regularly upheld delegations of power to the President in the national security and foreign policy realms. See, e. g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 319–322; Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 771–774 (1996). Indeed, if a strict non- delegation doctrine applied in those areas, numerous stat- utes—including many authorizations for use of military force in the Nation's history—would have been unconstitutional delegations of authority to the President. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (“[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or…Read in context ›
preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.