Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment · ¶72

Importantly, Twitter emphasized that “the concep[t] of aiding and abetting” does not “lend [itself] to crisp, bright-line distinctions,” ibid., but rather “should be understood in light of the common law,” id., at 497. The common law, in turn, recognizes that intent can sometimes be inferred from what the defendant knew when he acted. The Second Restatement of Torts explains that this kind of knowledge-based intent can be found where “the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment b (1963–1964). In these circumstances, the actor “is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.” Ibid. For example, someone who gives a gun to another, knowing with certainty that the other person will shoot someone with it, could be found to have intentionally…

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.