Postal Service v. Konan · ¶81

Here, reading “miscarriage” to capture intentional miscon- duct does precisely that.As noted above, the word “loss” typically connotes negligence, see supra, at 411–412, and the majority’s reading makes Congress’s specific inclusion of the “negligent” modifier for “transmission” entirely ineffective at serving its purpose—excluding intentional misconduct. See supra, at 410–411.There also does not appear to be any good reason why Congress would have wanted one term (“miscarriage,” alone) to cover intentional misconduct and not the other two terms.Indeed, under the majority’s broad definition of “miscarriage,” the words “loss” and “neg- ligent transmission” become no more than “misleading sur- plusage.”Yates, 574 U. S., at 546.

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