West Virginia v. B. P. J. · ¶130
Second, Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644 (2020), supports, not undermines, the Court’s conclusion. There, we faced the question whether firing an employee for being homosexual or transgender amounted to “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in violation of Title VII. Id., at 650– 651, 655 (internal quotation marks omitted). In answering that question, we took two things as given. One, everyone agreed that firing an employee counts as “discrimination” in violation of Title VII if done because of sex. See id., at 681. Two, we read the word “sex” in Title VII to refer to biological sex. Id., at 655. Given all that, the only issue we had to resolve was whether discriminating against individuals for being homosexual or transgender qualifies as discrimination “because of ” their biological sex. We held that it does. The statutory phrase “because of ” does not require…Read in context ›
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