West Virginia v. B. P. J. · ¶168
Even so, B. P. J. contends that the means deployed by West Virginia here, a total ban on participation, lack the right fit. She argues that the chosen classification bars a discrete subclass from participating in girls’ and women’s sports even though the State’s interests will not be furthered by their exclusion. According to B. P. J., transgender girls and women who both receive gender-affirming treatment and have never experienced endogenous male puberty neither possess any inherent athletic advantage nor pose any safety risks because of their sex identified at birth. As B. P. J. tells it, this distinct subclass is thus similarly situated to cisgender girls and women and yet is still being excluded. It is this overbreadth, she argues, that leads to the equal protection violation.Read in context ›
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