West Virginia v. B. P. J. · ¶214

The facts here illustrate the difference. B. P. J. was told that she cannot play on girls’ teams because she was identified as male at birth. If her sex identified at birth had been female, however, B. P. J. would have been allowed to play on girls’ teams. Bostock thus teaches that sex is a but- for cause of her exclusion. See 590 U. S., at 659–660 (concluding that a choice was made “because of sex” when “changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer”). From here, though, Bostock has nothing to say about whether this discrimination based on sex is unlawful. See ante, at 4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (articulating the same). On this point, B. P. J.’s claim fails because Title IX allows this sex distinction for the reasons explained.

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