West Virginia v. B. P. J. · ¶86

But this Court’s equal protection precedents allow general classifications like those made in the West Virginia and Idaho laws so long as there is at least a substantial relationship between the classification and the State’s interests. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533. After all, “most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.” Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 509 (quotation marks omitted). As the Court has long recognized, “[p]erfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam). For that reason, none of this Court’s “gender-based classification equal protection cases have required that the statute under consideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate objective in every instance.” Nguyen,…

slip opinion
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.