Berk v. Choy · ¶44

As the majority explains, our cases make clear beyond cavil that “a valid [Federal] Rule of Civil Procedure displaces contrary state law.” Ante, at 192. Thus, the nub of the confict inquiry is to determine whether the State's requirement is, in fact, contrary to a Federal Rule. Over time, we have expressed this central inquiry in various ways. See, e. g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 472 (1965) (asking whether “the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the [state] law”); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U. S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (asking whether the scope of the Federal Rule is “ `sufficiently broad' ” to “ `control the issue' ” before the Court, “thereby leaving no room for the operation” of the state law (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U. S. 740, 749–750, and n. 9 (1980))). But as the majority acknowledges, our most up-to-date approach to identifying the…

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