Berk v. Choy · ¶61

The problem with this reasoning is not that it is based on “a negative inference” about Rule 8, ante, at 195, n. 2, but rather the inattentively capacious scope of that negative inference. I agree that Rule 8(a)'s fnite list “preclude[s] courts” from imposing additional requirements. Ibid.; see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 168 (1993). But context is critical: Rule 8 does not purport to establish all that a medical malpractice plaintiff can be required to say about the merits of his claims at the beginning of the case, much less that nothing more than the filing of a complaint can be mandated. Rather, it (more narrowly) addresses what any “pleading” stating a claim for relief must contain. See Rule 8(a) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . .” (emphasis added)). The majority neither holds nor suggests…

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