Ellingburg v. United States · ¶29
The lodestar of this Court's ex post facto jurisprudence is Calder v. Bull, which established that the Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to laws that impose “punishment” for “crime[s].” 3 Dall., at 389–391. Calder—and especially Justice Chase's lead seriatim opinion—has since provided the defnitive gloss on the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Justice Chase's definition of “ex post facto laws” continues to “provid[e] an authoritative account of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Stogner v. California, 539 U. S. 607, 611 (2003); accord, e. g., Peugh, 569 U. S., at 532–533. This Court's modern precedents, including today's opinion, decide whether a law is subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses based on whether it satisfes Calder's requirement that it be “criminal or penal.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 29 (1981); see also ante, at 165. But this Court's implementation of Calder seems to have…Read in context ›
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