Ellingburg v. United States · ¶37
Some, myself included, have questioned whether Calder was right to limit the Ex Post Facto Clauses to laws imposing criminal punishment. See, e. g., Satterlee v. Mat thewson, 2 Pet. 380, 416, and n. (a) (1829) (opinion of Johnson, J.) (arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clauses protect more); O. Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 315, 331 (1922) (“[T]here have been reputable authorities, both past and present, who incline to the view that the ex post facto provisions of the Constitution prohibited civil as well as criminal legislation”); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498, 538–539 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring). Others have defended Calder's limitation. See, e. g., R. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 Idaho L. Rev. 489, 493–494 (2003); C. Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 578–582 (2003). But…Read in context ›
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