Ellingburg v. United States · ¶64

Other decisions followed the same reasoning. For example, when the United States brought a nominally civil action for damages based on a public offense, the defendants were entitled to other criminal-procedure protections because the action “was in its nature and essence, though not its form, a penal or criminal action.” United States v. Poyllon, 27 F. Cas. 608, 611, No. 16,081 (NY 1812). And when a statute forbade “any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute,” the statute applied to a nominally civil action for debt on behalf of the sovereign against someone who committed a public offense. Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 337, 340–341 (1805) (emphasis deleted). Chief Justice Marshall explained that the category of penal laws referred “not to any particular mode of proceeding, but generally to any prosecution, trial, or punishment for the offence.” Ibid.

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.