Chiles v. Salazar · ¶100

I begin my analysis with a simple observation: Our First Amendment jurisprudence does not treat speech as existing in a vacuum. Instead, how the First Amendment applies to a State's power to regulate speech depends upon the context in which the regulation of speech occurs. See, e. g., Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. 286 (2024) (trademark context); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969) (school context). We have not mechanically held that the First Amendment protects all communicative content; rather, we have evaluated First Amendment claims in a nuanced way, sensitive to both core principles and the specific circumstances under which the claim arises. See, e. g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 758, 762–770 (1976) (considering First Amendment principles in the commercial speech context).

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