Chiles v. Salazar · ¶105

A case that we decided in 2018—NIFLA—shows us the way to determine the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny here. 585 U. S. 755. In that case, we began by explaining that “[s]peech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by `professionals.' ” Id., at 767; see also ante, at 642– 643, 646–647. But, critically, we also acknowledged that the Court has afforded less protection for professional speech in two circumstances—one of which occurs when a State “regulate[s] professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech.” NIFLA, 585 U. S., at 768; see ante, at 643. This acknowledgement was grounded in an already well-established principle: “[T]he First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at . . . conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 567 (2011).

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