Chiles v. Salazar · ¶107

In NIFLA, we reaffirmed the principle from Casey that the First Amendment inquiry requires consideration of whether the regulated speech was made during the provision of medical care. NIFLA involved a challenge to a California law that required certain crisis pregnancy centers to post notices in their waiting rooms informing low-income patients that California paid for qualifying abortions. 585 U. S., at 762–763. We asked whether, on the one hand, this law was regulating the clinics' speech qua speech, or whether, on the other, the notice requirement was actually regulating the clinics' professional conduct and only incidentally restricting speech. If the latter, the NIFLA Court explained, California's notice requirement would ft into the category of cases that Casey illustrated; namely, those in which “this Court has upheld regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden…

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