Chiles v. Salazar · ¶108
Relying in part on Casey's analytical framework, the NIFLA Court held that California's law regulated “speech as speech.” 585 U. S., at 770. We explained this conclusion by contrasting the Pennsylvania regulation at issue in Casey: While the notice requirement in Casey restricted doctors' speech, it did so “only `as part of the practice of medicine.' ” 585 U. S., at 770. The notice requirement at issue in NIFLA, by contrast, was “not an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.” Ibid. “In fact,” California's notice was “not tied to a procedure at all. It applie[d] to all interactions between a covered facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure [was] ever sought, offered, or performed.” Ibid. (emphasis added). So, we reasoned, unlike Pennsylvania's informed- consent requirement in Casey, California's notice mandate warranted…Read in context ›
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